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Full Faith and Republican Guarantees: Gay Marriage,
FMPA, and the Courts
John C. Eastman*
I. INTRODUCTION
“What difference does it make to your heterosexual marriage if I
enter into a homosexual marriage?” Such is the frequent rejoinder to
claims that traditional marriage needs to be protected by state or federal
law or even by a federal constitutional amendment. The rejoinder point is
admirably well made by Professor Robert Riggs in The Supreme Court
and Same-Sex Marriage: A Prediction, also published in this symposium
issue.1 Professor Nick Bala elaborated on the same point and contends
that, at symposium in which these papers were delivered, no one offered
any argument rebutting that proposition.
I have a different point of view. Marriage may be an individual bond,
but it is fostered by society because it also fulfills fundamental societal
functions. Indeed, it is my contention that Professor Bala himself offered
ample arguments in support of this proposition. He said, for example,
that there is a substantial difference between marriage and domestic
partnerships both from the individual’s point of view and that of society
as a whole. He said that there is a profound symbolic significance to
extending marriage to same-sex couples. He asserted that such a move
would provide an important social validation to same-sex marriage, and
that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the institution of marriage
perpetuates the view that same-sex relationships are less worthy of
recognition—one might instead say less important to society in
furthering the societal goals advanced by marriage as it has traditionally
been understood.2
*Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law, and Director, The Claremont
Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence. This article is based on remarks delivered at a
symposium on the Federal Marriage Protection Amendment held at the J. Reuben Clark Law
School, Brigham Young University, in September 2005, and previously at a symposium on the
Federal Defense of Marriage Act held at the Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of
America, in May 2004.
1. See Robert E. Riggs, The Supreme Court and Same-Sex Marriage: A Prediction, 20 BYU
J. PUB. L. 345 (2006) (published in this issue).
2. Nicholas Bala, The Debates About Same-Sex Marriage in Canada and the United States:
Controversy Over the Evolution of a Fundamental Social Institution, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 195 (2006)
(published in this issue).
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Professor Bala then told the history—the non-static history—of
marriage. In his depiction of marriage history we find an unbelievably
important example for us: no-fault divorce. The United States did not
embrace no-fault divorce until 1969, and as Professor Bala pointed out,
the move to no-fault divorce has fundamentally changed the nature of
marriage in the short time since it was made.3
There were a significant number of people who, at the time it was
proposed, argued against no-fault divorce because it would change the
nature of marriage. No-fault divorce, it was argued, would undermine the
institution of marriage and the understanding of family, which has been
an important foundation for civilized society. Feminist theorists, in
particular, expressed concern about the economic consequences of nofault divorce to women and their custodial children.4 The response then
was much the same as it is now—it was what Justice Scalia described in
the related context of nude dancing as the “Thoreauvian ‘you-may-dowhat-you-like-so-long-as-it-does-not-injure-someone-else’ beau ideal”:5
How did the availability of no-fault divorce that might be utilized by
others hurt your marriage? Professor Bala answered that for us during his
presentation: the move to no-fault divorce fundamentally changed the
nature of marriage.6
The consequences of that change have been profound, even if not
perfectly understood. As one particularly insightful citizen noted during
recent debate over California’s Proposition 227:
Why do we have the institution of marriage anyway?
I believe that a society is only as strong as its permanent,
heterosexual, monogamous marriages. Consider the changes in America
in the last 40 years [since the move to no-fault divorce]. We changed
from having one of the lowest prison populations to having one of the
highest incarceration rates in the world, and 80 percent of the inmates
come from families with broken marriages or no marriages.
The teen suicide rate has more than tripled from 1960 to today.
During this same period, the divorce rate tripled and the number of
children living in homes with broken marriages increased from 8 percent
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985); Martha
Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change, A Study in Rhetoric
and Response in Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 789, both cited in
Lynn D. Wardle, Divorce Reform at the Turn of the Millennium: Certainties and Possibilities, 33
FAM. L. Q. 783, 783 (1999).
5. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 575 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
6. Nicholas Bala, supra note 2, at 200-201.
7. California’s Proposition 22 proposed that only marriage between a man and a woman be
valid or recognized in California.
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to 24 percent.
The academic achievement of American students falls way behind
students from around the world. It is not all the schools’ fault. More than
half of the students in our schools are living in broken homes. We can
have the best schools in the world, but if a child is not loved, cared for
and protected at home, he will almost never succeed in school.
I am coming to believe that the most important factor in achieving a
successful, safe and prosperous society is the strength of our marriages.
Children are delicate and tender and need, most of all, to have a father
and a mother who love each other and are committed to providing them a
safe, nurturing, permanent home to grow up in.8
The consequences of the latest push to disconnect marriage from
either its procreative or parenting functions will, I predict, be equally
profound, even if the full extent of those consequences cannot be
predicted with any degree of scientific certainty.
II. THE SHIFTING FOUNDATION FOR MARRIAGE
The Supreme Court’s 1885 decision in Murphy v. Ramsey9 is a good
place to start for a description of the earlier understandings of marriage.
Murphy was a voting rights case from the Utah Territory. Jesse Murphy
and other polygamists challenged the federal law requiring that a
prospective voter certify, under oath and as a precondition to voting
eligibility, that he was not a bigamist or polygamist. The Court upheld
the voting restriction, noting the importance of monogamous,
heterosexual marriage in the strongest of terms:
For, certainly, no legislation can be supposed more wholesome
and necessary in the founding of a free, self-governing
commonwealth . . . than that which seeks to establish it on the
basis of the idea of the family, as consisting in and springing
from the union for life of one man and one woman in the holy
estate of matrimony; the sure foundation of all that is stable and
noble in our civilization; the best guarantee of that reverent
morality which is the source of all beneficent progress in social
and political improvement.10
There is much wisdom in the Supreme Court’s early view, not the
least of which its focus on societal benefit rather than self-autonomy.
8. Bert J. Rapp, Letters: Support Marriage, VENTURA COUNTY STAR (California), Feb. 15,
2000, at B07.
9. Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885).
10. Id. at 45.
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Marriage may be an individual bond, but it is fostered by society because
it also fulfills important—indeed, fundamental—societal functions. As a
result, questions about the nature and scope of marriage cannot be
viewed simply as matters of individual rights, and those who do take this
view misunderstand the institution of marriage as well as society’s
historical role in fostering that institution and in benefiting from it.
The view of today’s courts is radically different. The entire focus has
shifted to the individual rights rather than the social institution view of
marriage, undoubtedly the result of a decades-long series of court
decisions depicting various rights to privacy and autonomy.11 The most
recent of these “rights revolution” cases, Lawrence v. Texas, cleared the
way for an extension of marriage beyond the monogamous, heterosexual
relationship grounded in the nature of male and female, that has
historically defined the institution. Justice Kennedy, writing for a fivejustice majority in Lawrence, held that the Texas anti-sodomy law did
not survive rational basis review—the most lenient level of judicial
scrutiny—when confronted with the claim that a prohibition on sodomy
infringed constitutionally-protected liberty interests.12 Under traditional
rational basis review, the constitutionality of the law is presumed, and
courts are required to uphold the law unless the person challenging the
law can demonstrate that there is no legitimate governmental purpose
furthered by the law.13 A legislature does not have to be correct in its
assessment that the law will further a legitimate governmental purpose as
long as it could reasonably believe that a legitimate purpose would be
advanced.
The question confronted by the Court in Lawrence was whether the
fostering of long-standing views about the immorality of certain sexual
conduct was a legitimate governmental interest. The traditional definition
of the state’s police power is the power of government to protect the
health, safety, welfare, and morals of the people.14 Sodomy has been
considered immoral for thousands of years by nearly every civilization
on earth.15 As Justice Scalia noted in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., “Our
society prohibits, and all human societies have prohibited, certain
11. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
12. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
13. See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 452 U.S. 314 (1981); Federal Communications Commission v.
Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993).
14. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. State of New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968).
15. See, e.g., Plato’s Laws, Book VIII 835d-842a; Genesis 19:5-8, 24-26; Deuteronomy
23:17; Leviticus 18:16-20, 22-23; 25 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1533) (making “buggery committed with mankind
or beast” a capital offense); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *215. See Survey on the
Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521,
525 (1986), from which these citations are drawn. See also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 19294 (1986).
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activities not because they harm others but because they are considered,
in the traditional phrase, ‘contra bonos mores,’ i.e., immoral. In
American society, such prohibitions have included, for example,
sadomasochism, cockfighting, bestiality, suicide, drug use, prostitution,
and sodomy.”16 From that statement and the fact that prohibitions on
sodomy had been upheld by the Supreme Court as recently as 1986, it is
evident that the Texas legislature could have reasonably believed that its
prohibition on homosexual sodomy furthered the legitimate
governmental interest of protecting the health, safety, welfare, and
morals of the people and therefore, would be upheld as constitutional.
In other words, the Texas statute should have easily survived rational
basis review. That it did not has led many commentators, and not a few
courts, to infer that Justice Kennedy was actually assessing the Texas
statute under a much stricter standard, perhaps even approaching strict
scrutiny.17 For Court tea-leaf readers, other evidence exists that a
standard approaching strict scrutiny is afoot. The opinion in Lawrence
was released June 26, 2003, the last court day of the term. Among the
end-of-term orders released the next morning was a GVR18 in Limon v.
Kansas,19 a case involving a male-on-male statutory rape conviction that
occurred in a Kansas juvenile facility for the developmentally disabled.
Although Justice Kennedy specifically noted in Lawrence that the
holding of irrationality was limited to actions by consenting adults in the
privacy of their own homes, Limon was remanded for further
consideration in light of Lawrence despite the fact that it did not involve
adults, or consent, or the privacy of one’s home. This odd GVR thus
indicates that none of the three limitations purportedly so critical to the
Lawrence holding were actually material, suggesting that some sort of
new-found fundamental right or suspect classification was instead
motivating the decision.
It did not take long for the implicit rationale of Lawrence to spread to
the same-sex marriage arena. Indeed, Justice Margaret Marshall’s
16. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 575 (1991).
17. See, e.g. Laurence Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The Fundamental Right that Dare Not
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004); United States v. Extreme Associates, Inc., 352
F.Supp.2d 578, 592 (W.D. Pa. 2005) (citing Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Lawrence to
support application of strict scrutiny to obscenity statute); Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free
Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 118 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (acknowledging argument that Lawrence requires
strict scrutiny for any state action dealing with procreation, sexuality, and family); see also People v.
Downin, 357 Ill.App.3d 193, 199 (2005) (rejecting contention that the “inescapable” conclusion to
be drawn from Lawrence is that engaging in homosexual conduct is a fundamental right subject to
strict scrutiny); Williams v. Attorney General of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1251-53 (11th Cir. 2004)
(Barkett, J., dissenting) (contending that Lawrence actually recognized a fundamental, due process
right to private sexual conduct, which is therefore subject to strict scrutiny).
18. GVR is an abbreviation for: grant the petition for writ of certiorari, vacate the judgment
below, and remand.
19. Limon v. Kansas, 539 U.S. 955 (2003).
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opinion for the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health20 took a page directly from Justice
Kennedy’s playbook. Although Justice Marshall claimed to have applied
rational basis review in striking down Massachusetts’ centuries-old
marriage law, that law should easily have passed constitutional muster
under the highly deferential standard of rational basis review. It is
perplexing, for example, how Justice Marshall could contend that there
was no rational basis for distinguishing between heterosexual and
homosexual couples in eligibility for marriage, even with respect to
procreation and the rearing of children!21
At least six other state and federal courts within the last ten years
have ruled there is a rational relation between the states’ definition of
marriage and procreation.22 In Lewis v. Harris, for example, the New
Jersey Court of Appeals noted “that the historical and prevailing
contemporary conception of marriage as solely a union between a single
man and a single woman is based partly on society’s view that this
institution plays an essential role in propagating the species and child
rearing.”23 The Indiana Court of Appeals held, in Morrison v. Sandler,
that “The State, first of all, may legitimately create the institution of
opposite-sex marriage, and all the benefits accruing to it, in order to
encourage male-female couples to procreate within the legitimacy and
stability of a state-sanctioned relationship and to discourage unplanned,
out-of-wedlock births resulting from ‘casual’ intercourse.”24 Justice
Marshall’s argument to the contrary—that not all heterosexual couples
bear or raise children, and that some same-sex couples, through artificial

20. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
21. Id. at 964. Professor Riggs conceded this point during discussion at the symposium,
stating: “The Goodridge decision is very badly reasoned and should have been based on strict
scrutiny.”
22. Wilson v. Ake, 354 F.Supp.2d 1298, 1309 (M.D. Fla. 2005) ([T]his court . . . is bound by
the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that encouraging the raising of children in homes consisting of a
married mother and father is a legitimate state interest. . . . DOMA is rationally related to this
interest”) (internal citations omitted); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 146 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004)
(“Authority exits [sic] that the promotion of marriage to encourage the maintenance of stable
relationships that facilitate to the maximum extent possible the rearing of children by both of their
biological parents is a legitimate congressional concern”); Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d
451, 463-64 (Ariz. App. Div. 1, 2003) (review denied 2004 Ariz. LEXIS 62, May 25, 2004) (“We
hold that the State has a legitimate interest in encouraging procreation and child-rearing within the
marital relationship, and that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples is rationally related to that
interest.”); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995) (“[I]t appears that the Supreme
Court has seen marriage as having a traditional principal purpose: to regulate and legitimize the
procreation of children. . . . I believe that this central purpose of the marriage statute – this emphasis
on child-bearing – provides the kind of rational basis defined in Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2642-43,
permitting limitation of marriage to heterosexual couples.”); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 24
(Ind. App. 2005); Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259 (N.J. App. 2005).
23. Lewis, 875 A.2d at 269 n.2.
24. Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 24.
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means or adoption, do bear and/or raise children—is one grounded in
strict scrutiny’s requirement of narrow tailoring, not in rational basis
review’s tolerance of imperfect fits. Reasonable people might disagree
about whether sexual orientation should be deemed a suspect
classification entitled to heightened scrutiny, or whether perpetuating
marriage as a monogamous heterosexual union constitutes good policy,
but it is simply dishonest to contend that such a policy judgment by the
people of Massachusetts does not pass rational basis review.
Moreover, even if Justice Marshall was correct in her assertion that
procreation and child-rearing do not provide a rational basis for
traditional marriage, there are other rationales, easily discerned, that
should have required the court’s affirmation of the long-standing
Massachusetts marriage law. Two businessmen in Massachusetts,25
troubled by the Goodridge decision, sketched out in graphic form a
perfectly sensible and legitimate governmental purpose that is furthered
by the historical definition of marriage. Before Goodridge, the family
structure encouraged by the Massachusetts marriage law looked
something like this:

In order to strengthen this family relationship, the Massachusetts
marriage laws restrict inter-family marriage. Chapter 207, Section 1, of
the Massachusetts statutory code provides that “No man shall marry his
mother, grandmother, daughter, granddaughter, sister, stepmother,
grandfather’s wife, grandson’s wife, wife’s mother, wife’s grandmother,
wife’s daughter, wife’s granddaughter, brother’s daughter, sister’s
daughter, father’s sister or mother’s sister.” Similarly, Section 2 provides
that “No woman shall marry her father, grandfather, son, grandson,
brother, stepfather, grandmother’s husband, daughter’s husband,

25. Bill Habeeb and Brian Carney at the Wynn Interactive Company in Boston. The graphic
depictions which follow are reprinted here with their permission.
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granddaughter’s husband, husband’s grandfather, husband’s son,
husband’s grandson, brother’s son, sister’s son, father’s brother or
mother’s brother.” The interplay of these laws and the historical
understanding of marriage produces the following matrix of permissible
relationships:

On its face, Goodridge worked a very small change in this graphical
depiction:
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And on the larger matrix, the change at first blush likewise seems
relatively minor:
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This all seems simple enough. Why should such a minor change
affect those who choose not to embrace it? What legitimate
governmental purpose could possibly be furthered by blocking such a
simple thing as this? Let us consider this minor change in light of the
other existing provisions of the Massachusetts marriage laws. The
statutory prohibitions on incest, for example, apply by their terms only to
members of the opposite sex. So unless there is some further
development in the law either by the legislature or the Supreme Judicial
Court, all of these interactions within the family are now permissible:

Of course, once we realize that it is permissible for a brother to marry his
brother, we will have to consider whether there is any possible rationale
for continuing to bar him from marrying his sister, and even the existing
prohibitions in Massachusetts would fall. The once well-ordered notion
of family would give way to this chaotic set of possible combinations:
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Surely preventing the slippery slope that would make possible such
chaos is a legitimate governmental purpose.
Of course, the courts might instead re-write the Massachusetts incest
statutes to ban same-sex intra-family marital relationships as well,26 and
we could write this example off as a silly hypothetical of the sort
typically served up by law professors in the classroom. But once we have
established that the ability to marry whomever one wants is a
fundamental, constitutionally-protected liberty interest—which, in truth,
is what the Goodridge decision does—would such a ban be permissible?
What principled understanding of liberty requires the recognition of
same-sex marriage but still permits restrictions on inter-family marriage
by consenting adults, once we have divorced marriage from its societal
purpose and made it rather a matter of individual right?
III. THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF GOODRIDGE AND LAWRENCE
The damage from Goodridge and Lawrence is more far-reaching
even than this, however. As I said, by pretending that there is no rational
basis for the long-standing Massachusetts marriage laws or the longstanding Texas prohibition against sodomy, the Goodridge and Lawrence
courts actually applied some unspoken form of strict scrutiny. Once that
proposition is firmly entrenched, a number of other existing restrictions
on whom one can marry, or how many one can marry, would likely fall
as well. Justice Scalia predicted this in his dissenting opinion in
Lawrence:
State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest,
prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and
obscenity are . . . sustainable only in light of Bowers’ validation of laws
based on moral choices. Every single one of these laws is called into
question by today’s decision; the Court makes no effort to cabin the
scope of its decision to exclude them from its holding.27

Already there are groups seeking to make good on Justice Scalia’s
prediction by pressing the outer limits of the Goodridge and Lawrence
holdings. In April 2004, for example, a feature article appeared in the
26. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 n.34 (Mass. 2003)
(“Nothing in our opinion today should be construed as relaxing or abrogating the consanguinity or
polygamy prohibitions of our marriage laws. . . . Rather, the statutory provisions concerning
consanguinity or polygamous marriages shall be construed in a gender neutral manner”).
27. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)); See also Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. Alaska, 122 P.3d 781, 793
(Alaska 2005) (noting, but rejecting on fairly specious grounds, government’s argument that
rationale requiring recognition of same-sex marriage would equally require recognition of
polygamous marriage).
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San Francisco Chronicle sympathetically portraying “polyamorists”—
those who have intimate attachments to multiple partners—and their
efforts to force recognition of their multi-faceted “marriages.” As one
woman quoted in the article noted, “I wear a wedding ring for my
husband and a bracelet for Conley,” the third person in the relationship.
The article also described a four-way relationship, noting that although
“Ann Spurry and her husband Terrance Rolf did not involve Peter and
Conley in their Alameda marriage ceremony, other polyamorist
Unitarians have proposed church ceremonies to bless threesomes,
foursomes and moresomes.”28 Similarly, new challenges to longstanding
restrictions on polygamy have recently been brought, and although such
challenges have thus far been unsuccessful, the courts appear to
recognize that the Lawrence holding will “likely” call into question
existing precedent upholding prohibitions on bigamy. As one New Jersey
court recently recognized:
The same form of constitutional attack that plaintiffs mount against
statutes limiting the institution of marriage to members of the opposite
sex also could be made against statutes prohibiting polygamy. Persons
who desire to enter into polygamous marriages undoubtedly view such
marriages, just as plaintiffs view same-sex marriages, as “compelling
and definitive expression[s] of love and commitment” among the
parties to the union.29

Will the state not be equally obligated to recognize these “marriages”
too, once a liberty-interest-in-personal-fulfillment model of marriage
supplants the societal-benefit model heretofore recognized and fostered?
Recently an e-mail circulated across the internet making some
humorous predictions of what a state-sponsored marriage license system
would look like once the shift to an individual-fulfillment model of
marriage had been accomplished. It read something like this:
•

Marriage licenses should be like fishing licenses.

•

You want resident or visitor? Salt water, fresh, or both? Just for
the weekend, 30-days, all year? Lifetime? Wow; brave soul!

28. Don Lattin, Bay Area Committed to Marriage for the Masses: Polyamorists Say They
Relate Honestly to Multiple Partners, S. F. CHRON., Apr. 20, 2004 at B1.
29. Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 270 (N.J. Super., App. Div. 2005); see also Goodridge,
798 N.E.2d at 984 n.2 (Cordy, J., dissenting) (“The same semantic sleight of hand [applied by the
majority] could transform every other restriction on marriage into a right of fundamental importance.
For example, if one assumes that a group of mature, consenting, committed adults can form a
‘marriage,’ the prohibition on polygamy . . . infringes on their ‘right’ to ‘marry’”).
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•

Cotton to your brother or sister? Try the salmon stamp.
Endangered species.

•

Hey you, Oedipus! Try the Matriarch Special? Only fourteen
dollars extra!

•

Same-sex? You’ve got a choice of a pink or a blue stamp.

•

Plural marriage? Now you’re really talkin’! How many stamps
you want?

•

These are good only in California, of course. No Full Faith and
Credit or Supremacy problems here.

•

You want the Traditional Nationwide-Worldwide Special? We
have a deal on that, this week only.

•

Proceeds from all stamps go to the Marriage Rights Litigation
Fund.

•

Wear your license on the front of your jacket or hat where it can
be seen by the Warden at all times, and remember, anything too
young has to be thrown back!

A more serious version of the same proposition was recently published
by the San Francisco Chronicle. In a Sunday opinion piece, Professor
Colin Jones argued for a “free-market” approach to marriage, in which “a
plethora of choices would become available to prospective
newlyweds.”30 He elaborated on just what he had in mind:
A Catholic marital corporation would forbid its members from
divorcing. Progressive marital corporations would allow gay marriage.
Islamic or Mormon fundamentalist marital corporations could allow
polygamy. Plain vanilla marital corporations would probably be
popular among people who just want to get married without thinking
about it too much. . . . [M]inors below a certain age would be excluded
from joining a marital corporation.31

At least Professor Jones was honest enough to admit candidly that
“allowing same-sex unions (either through a marital corporation regime
or the ad hoc approach some states are already following) will eliminate
the presumption of reproduction that underlies traditional marriage,” and

30. Colin P.A. Jones, Marriage Proposal: Why Not Privatize? Partnerships Could Be
Tailored to Fit, S. F. CHRON., Jan. 22, 2006 at D1.
31. Id.
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that “[i]f the presumption of reproduction is no longer needed, then there
is no real reason to prevent incestuous marriages.”32
Yet even more absurd consequences will be possible once the shift
from the societal-institution model to the personal-fulfillment model as
the foundation for marriage is accomplished. In the wake of the
Goodridge decision, several Massachusetts legislators introduced “An
Act Relative to Archaic Crimes”33 that would repeal the long-standing
statute forbidding the “abominable and detestable crime against nature,
either with mankind or with a beast.”34 Although a new law would
continue to forbid “a sexual act on an animal”—apparently the reference
to crimes against nature is passé—the punishment was reduced from a
maximum 20-year term in state prison by permitting an alternate
punishment of a mere two and a half-year maximum term in the county
jail or a $5,000 fine,35 and one has to wonder how even the reduced
punishment can be imposed for such an intrusion on one’s liberty.
Although the Massachusetts law has not been adopted, a similar
story has already played out in the Netherlands. In March 2004, Reuters
reported a story about a Dutch prosecutor who declined to prosecute a
man engaged in bestiality because there was no explicit law against
bestiality on the books. Legislators who quickly moved to remedy that
oversight struggled to find an appropriate ground on which to sustain
such a law. The patent immorality of the conduct was no longer
sufficient in a world awash in the fundamental right to self-fulfillment, so
the legislature instead had to rest its new prohibition on the claim that
such conduct would infringe the animal’s right to physical integrity
without its consent, a consent that it is not possible for an animal to give.
How that rationale could be squared with the fact that animals’ physical
integrity is routinely and thoroughly violated without their consent when
they are slaughtered for food, the legislature did not say. Nor did the
legislature explain why an animal’s right to physical integrity should
outweigh a human being’s right to self-fulfillment—perhaps that will be
the subject of the next round of litigation.
A similar scenario played out in Utah a few years ago. A man
entered the cage of a crane at the Tracy Aviary in Salt Lake City and
proceeded to rape the bird, which subsequently died as a result. The
state sought to press charges, but the legislature had omitted the crime of
bestiality when it rewrote the criminal code a few years earlier,
apparently it the mistaken belief that the prohibition was anachronistic.
32. Id.
33. Senate Bill No. 938, available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/bills/senate/st00/
st00938.htm.
34. Mass. Gen. Laws, Ch. 272, § 34.
35. Senate Bill No. 938, supra, n. 33.
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Instead, the man was charged with a simple destruction of property (for
the death of the $1200 bird). The legislature reinstated the bestiality
statute the next legislative session.36
These are, of course, slippery slope arguments, and like all slippery
slope arguments, they tend to focus on absurd examples to prove a point.
The point here is not that these consequences will necessarily follow, or
even that homosexual sexual relations are comparable to polygamous or
inter-specie sexual relations. The point, rather, is that there is no
principled way to distinguish these things once self-fulfillment becomes
the sina qua non of the institution of marriage.
Maybe all of this makes sense as a matter of policy, but the latest
spate of litigation has not proceeded as though this were simply a dispute
about policy. Instead, the individual rights model that underlay the latest
litigation has encouraged courts to make fundamental policy decisions
that heretofore have been made by legislatures. In the process, they have
discarded the policy purposes served by the traditional model of
marriage, probably at great peril.
IV. SOCIETY’S INTEREST IN TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE
What are the legitimate policies served by the traditional model, and
why should we be concerned than unelected, unaccountable judges have
so cavalierly discarded such long-standing policy? Recent litigation in
California challenging the state’s prohibition on same-sex marriage has
brought several to the forefront.37 In 1859, shortly after California

36. Salt Lake Tribune, May 2, 2000, B2.
37. The discussion which follows is drawn from an amicus curiae brief I filed in my capacity
as Director of the Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence in the consolidated
Marriage Cases (Cal. Ct. App., 1st App. Dist., Div. 3, Coordination Proceeding No. 4365) on behalf
of James Q. Wilson, Emeritus Professor, University of California, Los Angeles; Hadley Arkes,
Edward N. Ney Professor of Jurisprudence and American Institutions, Amherst College; Steven G.
Calabresi, George C. Dix Professor of Constitutional Law, Northwestern University School of Law;
Lloyd Cohen, Professor of Law at George Mason University School of Law; Edward J. Erler,
Department of Political Science, California State University, San Bernardino; Robert P. George,
McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence, Princeton University; Leon Kass, University of Chicago;
Charles Kesler, Professor of Government, Claremont McKenna College; Douglas W. Kmiec, Chair
and Professor of Constitutional Law, Pepperdine University; Daniel H. Lowenstein, Professor,
University of California, Los Angeles; David Popenoe, Professor of Sociology, Rutgers University;
Stephen B. Presser, Raoul Berger Professor of Legal History, Northwestern University School of
Law; Katherine Shaw Spaht, Jules F. and Frances L. Landry Professor of Law, Louisiana State
University Law Center; and Thomas G. West, Professor of Politics, University of Dallas, an
interdisciplinary group of legal and family scholars with a professional and scholarly interest in the
role of marriage in law and society. The principal author of the brief was co-counsel Joshua K.
Baker, Institute for Marriage and Public Policy, who drew on arguments previously published by
Maggie Gallagher, President of the Institute for Marriage and Public Policy, in (How) Will Gay
Marriage Weaken Marriage as a Social Institution: A Reply to Andrew Koppelman, 2 UNIV. ST.
THOMAS L. J. 33 (Fall 2004).
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became a state, the California Supreme Court held in Baker v. Baker that,
“the first purpose of matrimony, by the laws of nature and society, is
procreation.”38 The opinion was written by Justice Stephen Field, who
later became a highly-regarded Associate Justice on the Supreme Court
of the United States. In Sharon v. Sharon, the California Court cited a
treatise stating that “the procreation of children under the shield and
sanction of the law” is one of the “two principal ends of marriage.”39
More recently, the California Court of Appeals has reiterated Justice
Field’s view that the “first purpose of matrimony, by the laws of nature
and society, is procreation.”40 And in Maslow v. Maslow, the Second
Appellate District explicitly connected the procreation aspect of marriage
to societal interest: “Ordinary marriage relations between husband and
wife are the foundation on which the perpetuation of society and
civilization rests.”41
Nor is California alone in this view. Most states and the United
States Supreme Court itself have in the past similarly recognized that the
state’s principal interest in marriage is procreation. In Skinner v.
Oklahoma, the Supreme Court noted a connection between marriage and
procreation, observing that “[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental
to the very existence and survival of the race.”42 The New Jersey courts
have recognized that “[p]rocreation, if not the sole, is at least an
important, reason for the existence of the marriage
relation.”43 The New York courts have adopted a similar
view: “The great end of matrimony is . . . the procreation of a progeny
having a legal title to maintenance by the father.”44 The Fifth Circuit in
Poe v. Gerstein noted that “procreation of offspring could be considered
one of the major purposes of marriage. . . .”45 In Singer v. Hara, the
Washington Court of Appeals noted that “marriage exists as a protected
legal institution primarily because of societal values associated with the
propagation of the human race.”46 The Minnesota Supreme Court in
Baker v. Nelson recognized that the “institution of marriage as a union of
man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of

38. Baker v. Baker, 13 Cal. 87, 103 (1859).
39. Sharon v. Sharon, 75 Cal. 1 (1888) (quoting STEWART ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, §
103).
40. Schaub v. Schaub, 71 Cal. App. 2d 467, 478 (App. Ct. 1945); See also Aufort v. Aufort, 9
Cal. App. 2d 310, 311 (App. Ct. 1935) (“Again, the first purpose of matrimony, by the laws of
nature and society, is procreation”).
41. Maslow v. Maslow, 117 Cal. App.2d 237, 241 (App. Ct. 1953).
42. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
43. Davis v. Davis, 106 A. 644, 645 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1919).
44. Laudo v. Laudo, 197 N.Y.S. 396, 397 (App. Div. 1919).
45. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 1975).
46. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. App. 1974).
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children within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis.”47 I could go
on at length,48 but I will close with this observation from New Jersey:
“Lord Penzance has observed that the procreation of children is one of
the ends of marriage. I do not hesitate to say that it is the most important
object of matrimony, for without it the human race itself would perish
from the earth.”49
Of course, procreation can, and often does, occur outside of
marriage. Thus, it must be that the government’s interest in marriage is
not simply unfettered procreation, but procreation under circumstances
that the state reasonably believes will provide the optimal conditions for
raising children—a stable home, headed by a monogamous couple who
are the children’s natural parents. As far back as 30 A.D., Musonius
Rufus, a Roman Stoic, recognized that the institution of marriage does
more than foster mere procreation:
The birth of a human being which results from such a union is to be
sure something marvelous, but it is not yet enough for the relation of
husband and wife, inasmuch as quite apart from marriage it could result
from any other sexual union, just as in the case of animals.50

In other words, the state’s interest in marriage is in more than just
procreation, but in paternity as well—the common-sense of which has
47. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed for want of a
substantial federal question, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
48. See, e.g., Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff’d 673 F.2d
1036 (9th Cir. 1982) (observing that a “state has a compelling interest in encouraging and fostering
procreation of the race”); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 337 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (finding that this “central purpose . . . provides the kind of rational
basis . . . permitting limitation of marriage to heterosexual couples”); Zoglio v. Zoglio, 157 A.2d
627, 628 (D.C. App. 1960) (“One of the primary purposes of matrimony is procreation”); Lyon v.
Barney, 132 Ill. App. 45, 50 (App. Ct. 1907) (“[T]he procreating of the human species is regarded, at
least theoretically, as the primary purpose of marriage . . .”); Gard v. Gard, 169 N.W. 908, 912
(Mich. 1918) (“It has been said in many of the cases cited that one of the great purposes of marriage
is procreation”); Frost v. Frost, 181 N.Y.S.2d 562, 563 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1958) (discussing
“one of the primary purposes of marriage, to wit, the procreation of the human species”); Ramon v.
Ramon, 34 N.Y.S. 2d 100, 108 (Fam. Ct. Div. Richmond County 1942) (“The procreation of offspring under the natural law being the object of marriage, its permanency is the foundation of the
social order”); Pretlow v. Pretlow, 14 S.E.2d 381, 385 (Va. 1941) (“The State is interested in
maintaining the sanctity of marriage relations, and it is interested in the ordered preservation of the
race. It has a double interest”); Stegienko v. Stegienko, 295 N.W. 252, 254 (Mich. 1940) (stating that
“procreation of children is one of the important ends of matrimony”); Grover v. Zook, 87 P.638, 639
(Wash. 1906) (“One of the most important functions of wedlock is the procreation of children”);
Heup v. Heup, 172 N.W.2d 334, 336 (Wis. 1969) (“Having children is a primary purpose of
marriage”).
49. Turney v. Avery, 113 A. 710, 710 (N.J. Ch. 1921) (citations omitted).
50. Musonius Rufus, Fragment 13A, What Is the Chief End of Marriage?, translated in
MUSONIUS RUFUS: THE ROMAN SOCRATES 89 (Cora E. Lutz ed. & trans., 1947).
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been known at least as long ago as Plato toyed with the idea of a political
order based on the community of wives and children.51 As Professor
John Witte recently noted, American jurists addressing the connection
between marriage and procreation have drawn on a long-standing
philosophical discourse that understood the word “procreation” to refer
to more than the mere physical generation of children’s bodies:
Procreation, however, means more than just conceiving children. It also
means rearing and educating them for spiritual and temporal living—a
common Stoic sentiment. The good of procreation cannot be achieved
in this fuller sense simply through the licit union of husband and wife
in sexual intercourse. It also requires maintenance of a faithful, stable,
and permanent union of husband and wife for the sake of their
children.52

The State also has a legitimate, indeed compelling, interest in
maximizing the likelihood that children are raised by both their mothers
and their fathers in a low-conflict marriage. Current social scientific data
suggests that the law of marriage protects children to the extent that it
increases the likelihood that children will be born to and raised by their
biological mother and father in a low-conflict union. Child Trends, a
leading and respected child research organization, summed up the current
social science consensus on common family structures as follows:
Research clearly demonstrates that family structure matters for
children, and the family structure that helps the most is a family headed
by two biological parents in a low-conflict marriage. Children in singleparent families, children born to unmarried mothers, and children in
stepfamilies or cohabiting relationships face higher risks of poor
outcomes. . . . There is thus value for children in promoting strong,
stable marriages between biological parents.53

The risks to children when mothers and fathers do not get and stay
married include: poverty,54 suicide,55 mental illness,56 physical illness,57
51. Plato, THE REPUBLIC, Book IV, 423e-424a (Giovanni R. F. Ferrari ed., Tom Griffith
trans., Cambridge University Press 2000).
52. John Witte, Jr., Propter Honoris Respectum: The Goods and Goals of Marriage, 76
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1019, 1035 (2001).
53. Kristin Anderson Moore, et al., “Marriage from a Child’s Perspective: How Does Family
Structure Affect Children and What Can We Do About It?” Child Trends Research Brief, June 2002,
at 1.
54. I. Sawhill, “Families at Risk,” in SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: THE 2000 ELECTION
AND BEYOND 97-135 (H.J. Aaron and R.D. Reischauer, eds., 1999); Sara McLanahan, Family, State,
and Child Well-Being, 26 ANN. REV. OF SOC. 703 (2000); Mark R. Rank & Thomas A. Hirschl, The
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infant mortality,58 lower educational attainment,59 juvenile delinquency
and conduct disorder,60 adult criminality,61 early unwed parenthood,62
lower life expectancy,63 and less warm and close relations with both
Economic Risk of Childhood in America: Estimating the Probability of Poverty Across the
Formative Years, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1058 (1999).
55. Gregory R. Johnson, et al., Suicide Among Adolescents and Young Adults: A CrossNational Comparison of 34 Countries, 30 SUICIDE LIFE-THREATENING BEHAV. 74 (2000); David
Lester, Domestic Integration and Suicide in 21 Nations, 1950-1985, XXXV INT’L J. COMP. SOC. 131
(1994); David M. Cutler, et al., Explaining the Rise in Youth Suicide, National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper 7713 (2000).
56. E. MAVIS HETHERINGTON & JOHN KELLY, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: DIVORCE
RECONSIDERED (2002); Paul R. Amato, Children of Divorce in the 1990s: An Update of the Amato
and Keith (1991) Meta-Analysis, 15 J. OF FAM. PSYCHOL. 355 (2001); Ronald L. Simons, et al.,
Explaining the Higher Incidence of Adjustment Problems Among Children of Divorce Compared
with Those in Two-Parent Families, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1020 (1999); Andrew J. Cherlin, et al.,
Effects of Parental Divorce on Mental Health Throughout the Life Course, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 239
(1998).
57. Ronald Angel & Jacqueline Worobey, Single Motherhood and Children’s Health, 29 J.
HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 38 (1988); Olle Lundberg, The Impact of Childhood Living Conditions on
Illness and Mortality in Adulthood, 36 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1047 (1993).
58. Trude Bennett, Marital Status and Infant Health Outcomes, 35(9) SOC. SCI. & MED. 1179
(1992); Trude Bennett & Paula Braveman, Maternal Marital Status as a Risk Factor for Infant
Mortality, 26(6) FAM. PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 252 (1994); J.A. Gaudino, Jr., et al., No Fathers’
Names: A Risk Factor for Infant Mortality in the State of Georgia, 48 SOC. SCI. & MED. 253 (1999);
C.D. Siegel, et al., Mortality from Intentional and Unintentional Injury Among Infants of Young
Mothers in Colorado, 1982 to 1992, 150(10) ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 1077
(1996).
59. See, e.g., SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE
PARENT: WHAT HELPS, WHAT HURTS (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) (1994); Paul R.
Amato, Children of Divorce in the 1990s: An Update of the Amato and Keith (1991) Meta-Analysis,
15(3) J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 355 (2001); Timothy J. Biblarz & Gregg Gottainer, Family Structure and
Children’s Success: A Comparison of Widowed and Divorced Single-Mother Families, 62(2) J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 533 (2000); Zeng-Yin Cheng & Howard B. Kaplan, Explaining the Impact of
Family Structure During Adolescence on Adult Educational Attainment, 7(2) APPLIED BEHAV. &
SCI. REV. 23 (1999); William H. Jeynes, The Effects of Several of the Most Common Family
Structures on the Academic Achievement of Eighth Graders, 30(1/2) MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 73
(2000); Dean Lillard & Jennifer Gerner, Getting to the Ivy League, 70(6) J. HIGHER EDUC. 206
(1996).
60. Chris Coughlin & Samuel Vuchinich, Family Experience in Preadolescence and the
Development of Male Delinquency, 58(2) J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 491 (1996); Ross L. Matsueda &
Karen Heimer, Race, Family Structure and Delinquency: A Test of Differential Association and
Social Control Theories, 52 AM. SOC. REV. 171 (1987); George Thomas & Michael P. Farrell, The
Effects of Single-Mother Families and Nonresident Fathers on Delinquency and Substance Abuse,
58(4) J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 884 (1996).
61. Cynthia Harper & Sara McLanahan, Father Absence and Youth Incarceration, paper
presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association (August 1998).
62. E. MAVIS HETHERINGTON & JOHN KELLY, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: DIVORCE
RECONSIDERED (2002); Catherine E. Ross & John Mirowsky, Parental Divorce, Life-Course
Disruption, and Adult Depression, 61(4) J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1034 (1999); Andrew J. Cherlin et
al., Parental Divorce in Childhood and Demographic Outcomes in Young Adulthood, 32
DEMOGRAPHY 299 (1995).
63. J.E. Schwartz, et al., Childhood Sociodemographic and Psychosocial Factors as
Predictors of Mortality Across the Life-Span, 85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1237 (1995); Joan S. Tucker.
et al., Parental Divorce: Effects on Individual Behavior and Longevity, 73(2) J. PERSONALITY &
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mothers and fathers.64 Thus, any development that weakens the
traditional family headed by married, biological parents is likely to
increase all of these risks to children, and also to the communities in
which these children live.
Consider, for example, just one of the increased risks children face
when mothers and fathers do not get and stay married: criminal and
delinquent behavior. An impressive number of social science studies
confirm that individual children are more likely to engage in criminal
conduct when raised in fatherless households. For example, a 2000 study
that looked at crime in rural counties in four states concluded, “[A]n
increase of 13% in female-headed households would produce a doubling
of the offense rate. . . .”65
A study that analyzed a database following 6,403 males from their
teens to their early thirties concluded that after controlling for race,
income and family background, boys who were raised outside of intact
marriages were two to three times more likely to commit a crime that
leads to incarceration. The authors concluded: “The results . . . show that,
controlling for income and all other factors, youths in father-absent
families (mother only, mother-stepfather, and relatives/other) still had
significantly higher odds of incarceration than those from other-father
families66. . . . Youth who never had a father in the household had the
highest incarceration odds.”67
In addition, recent studies depict important indirect effects of
increases in fatherless families on children in intact families as well. In a
large (but non-scientific) sample of 4,671 eighth graders drawn from
students attending 35 schools in ten cities, researchers found that
students attending schools with a higher proportion of teens from singleparent families committed more violent offenses, regardless of their own
family structure. “An important thing to notice about the results is that it
matters how many single-parent families a student is exposed to,

SOC. PSYCHOL. 381 (1997).
64. ALAN C. ACOCK & DAVID H. DEMO, FAMILY DIVERSITY AND WELL-BEING (1994); PAUL
R. AMATO & ALAN BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK (1997); Nicholas Zill, et al., Long-Term Effects
of Parental Divorce on Parent-Child Relationships, Adjustment, and Achievement in Young
Adulthood, 7(1) J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 91 (1993); E. MAVIS HETHERINGTON & JOHN KELLY, FOR
BETTER OR FOR WORSE: DIVORCE RECONSIDERED (2002); William S. Aquilino, Impact of
Childhood Family Disruption on Young Adults’ Relationships with Parents, 56 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
295 (1994).
65. D. Wayne Osgood & Jeff M. Chambers, Social Disorganization Outside the Metropolis:
An Analysis of Rural Youth Violence, 38 CRIMINOLOGY 81, 103 (2000).
66. “Other-father families” are families in which the adult male is not the biological father.
67. Cynthia C. Harper & Sara S. McLanahan, Father Absence and Youth Incarceration,
14(3) J. RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 369, 385-86 (2004).
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regardless of whether the student has one or two parents in the home.”68
The benefits of marriage for children described by this social science
literature do not appear to be direct legal incidents of marriage, of the
kind that the state can therefore transfer at will to other family forms.
Children living with remarried parents, for example, appear to do no
better than children with single mothers, on average.69 A review of the
last decade’s research published in the Journal of Marriage and Family in
2000 concluded: “[M]ost researchers reported that stepchildren were
similar to children living with single mothers on the preponderance of
outcome measures and that stepchildren generally were at greater risk for
problems than were children living with both of their parents.”70
Existing scientific data thus suggests that the law of marriage

68. Amy L. Anderson, Individual and Contextual Influences on Delinquency: The Role of the
Single-Parent Family, 30 J. CRIMINAL JUSTICE 575, 585 (2002).
69. “Research does not generally support the idea that remarriage is better for children than
living with a single mother.” INSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN VALUES, WILLIAM J. DOHERTY, ET AL.,
WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: 21 CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 5 (2002); see also, SARA
MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: WHAT HELPS, WHAT
HURTS (1994) (“In general, compared with children living with both their parents, young people
from disrupted families are more likely to drop out of high school, and young women from oneparent families are more likely to become teen mothers, irrespective of the conditions under which
they began to live with single mothers and irrespective of whether their mothers remarry or
experience subsequent disruptions.”); Stephen Demuth & Susan L. Brown, Family structure, family
processes, and adolescent delinquency: the significance of parental absence versus parental gender,
41 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 58, 71 (2004) (“[A]dolescents living in single-mother, singlefather, and stepfamilies report significantly higher delinquency than those in two-biological-parent
married families. These differences remain significant even after controlling for child and parent
characteristics.”); Thomas L. Hanson, et al., Double jeopardy: parental conflict and stepfamily
outcomes for children, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 141, 146 (1996) (“[F]or the most part, children in
stepfather households and children in single-mother households score similarly on the measures of
academic performance and psychological adjustment.”); William H. Jeynes, Effects of remarriage
following divorce on the academic achievement of children, 28 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 385, 390
(1999) (“These findings do not support the assumption held by many educators that children of
divorce from reconstituted homes are better off academically than children of divorce from singleparent homes. Remarriage following divorce does not positively affect academic achievement and
may actually have a negative effect on academic achievement.”) (emphasis in original); Valerie E.
Lee, et al., Family Structure and Its Effect on Behavioral and Emotional Problems in Young
Adolescents, 4 J. RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 405, 429 (1994) (“Another finding we wish to highlight is
the fact that eighth graders are at least as likely to experience problems as a result of living in
households occupied by stepfamilies as in single-parent households.”); Wendy D. Manning &
Kathleen A. Lamb, Adolescent well-being in cohabiting, married, and single-parent families, 65 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 876, 890 (2003) (“Adolescents in married, two-biological-parent families
generally fare better than children in any of the family types examined here, including single-mother,
cohabiting stepfather, and married stepfather families. The advantage of marriage appears to exist
primarily when the child is the biological offspring of both parents”); Nicholas Zill, et al., Long-term
Effects of Parental Divorce on Parent-Child Relationships, Adjustment, and Achievement in Young
Adulthood. 7 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 91, 99 (1993) (“[T]here is no clear evidence that remarriage has a
protective or ameliorative effect against the negative consequences of family discord and
disruption”).
70. Marilyn Coleman, et al., Reinvestigating Remarriage: Another Decade of Progress, 62 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 1288, 1292 (2000).
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protects children to the extent it increases the likelihood that children
will be born to and raised by their own mother and father in a reasonably
harmonious union. By the same token, the data suggest that anything that
weakens the institution of man/woman marriage, or that indirectly
encourages people to have children outside of such unions (e.g. by
suggesting that mother/father homes have no special importance for
children because what counts is only love and not family structure), will
place many children at risk.
Meanwhile, relatively little is known from a scientific standpoint
about how children fare raised by same-sex couples from birth,
compared to other family structures. For example, after reviewing
several hundred studies for the Attorney General of Canada, University
of Virginia sociologist Steve Nock concluded:
Through this analysis I draw my conclusions that 1) all of the articles I
reviewed contained at least one fatal flaw of design or execution; and
2) not a single one of those studies was conducted according to
generally accepted standards of scientific research.71

Other scholars have noted similar concerns.72 A recent review of
social science evidence on same-sex parenting appeared in the Fall 2005
issue of The Future of Children, a peer-reviewed journal published
jointly by Princeton University and the Brookings Institution. The two
gay scholars, both proponents of same-sex marriage, note that because of
limitations in this body of research, “What the evidence does not
provide, because of the methodological difficulties we outlined, is much
knowledge about whether those studied are typical or atypical of the
general population of children raised by gay and lesbian couples. We do
not know how the normative child in a same-sex family compares with
other children.”73
As the Goodridge dissent points out:

71. Nock Aff. ¶ 3, Halpern v. Attorney General of Canada, Case No. 684/00 (Ont. Sup. Ct.
of Justice), available at http://marriagelaw.cua.edu/Law/cases/Canada/ontario/halpern/aff_nock.pdf
(last visited December 6, 2005).
72. See, e.g., Diana Baumrind, Commentary on Sexual Orientation: Research and Social
Policy Implications, 31(1) DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 130 (1995). Another review, prepared by
Robert Lerner and Althea Nagai in 2001, looked at forty-nine separate parenting studies before
concluding that “the methods used in these studies are so flawed that the studies prove nothing.”
Robert Lerner & Althea K. Nagai, No Basis: What the Studies Don’t Tell Us About Same-Sex
Parenting 6 (2001).
73. William Meezan & Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage, Same-Sex Parenting and America’s
Children, 15(2) FUTURE OF CHILD. 97, 104 (Fall 2005).
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[A]ttempts at scientific study of the ramifications of
raising children in same-sex couple households are
themselves in their infancy and have so far produced
inconclusive and conflicting results. . . . Our belief that
children raised by same-sex couples should fare the same
as children raised in traditional families is just that: a
passionately held but utterly untested belief. The
Legislature is not required to share that belief but
may . . . wish to see the proof before making a
fundamental alteration to that institution.74

Moreover, despite the weakening of our marriage culture that has
occurred in the forty years since the “free love” and no-fault divorce
movements of the 1960s, the old view of marriage as a loving sexual
union that has as a core purpose encouraging men and women to make
and rear the next generation together, continues to hold. A 2005
nationally representative poll of American marriage attitudes, supervised
by University of Texas sociologist Norval T. Glenn, asked Americans
whether the most important good of marriage was “the happiness and
well-being of the married individuals” or “children who are welladjusted and who will become good citizens.” Only 13 percent of
Americans said the happiness of adults was the most important purpose
of marriage; 74 percent insisted that both are equally important.75
Admittedly, there is not a perfect correlation between monogamous,
heterosexual marriage and procreation; some heterosexual couples marry
beyond the child-bearing years, and others choose not to have children at
all. But for the vast majority of heterosexual marriages, procreation
remains not only a distinct possibility but an express purpose of
marriage,76 and the institution is designed to encourage that children are
74. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 979-80 (Mass. 2003) (Sosman, J.,
dissenting).
75. Norval T. Glenn, With this Ring: A National Survey on Marriage in America 30 (National
Fatherhood Initiative: Gaithersburg, MD) (2005).
76. The Sacrament of Marriage in the Catholic Church, for example, “is a covenant by which
a man and a woman establish in the presence of God and His Church a lifetime partnership, which
by nature is ordered for the good of the spouses and the procreation of children.” “MARRIAGE,”
GLOSSARY, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 887 (2d ed., 2000) (emphasis added); See also
CODE OF CANON LAW, Cod. iur. can., c. 1013 & 7 (“The primary end of marriage is the procreation
and the education of children”); THE BAPTIST CONFESSION OF FAITH OF 1689, Ch. 25, ¶ 2
(“Marriage was ordained for the mutual help of husband and wife, for the increase of mankind with a
legitimate issue, and the preventing of uncleanliness”) (citing Gen. 1:28, emphasis added) (available
at http://www.1689.com/Confession/confession.html#Ch.%2025); “HUMAN SEXUALITY: A
THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE,” A REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THEOLOGY AND CHURCH
RELATIONS OF THE LUTHERAN CHURCH-MISSOURI SYNOD, at 7 (“In marriage God intends to
provide for (1) the relation of man and woman in mutual love (Gen. 2:18); (2) the procreation of
children (Gen. 1:28); and (3) the partial remedy for sinful lust (1 Cor. 7:2)”) (available at
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not just conceived, but reared—by both biological mother and biological
father, the individuals with the strongest natural bond to the children.
Moreover, even marital unions of husband and wife that do not produce
children further the state’s interest in procreation and paternity, because
they reduce the possibility of alternative sexual unions that may produce
out-of-wedlock births. Only by first committing to an exclusive, faithful,
enduring sexual, financial and emotional union can men and women
attracted to the opposite sex ensure that any children they conceive will
be protected by and connected to both their mother and father. As the
Indiana Court of Appeals recently noted:
One of the State’s key interests in supporting opposite-sex marriage is
not necessarily to encourage and promote “natural” procreation across
the board and at the expense of other forms of becoming parents, such
as by adoption and assisted reproduction; rather, it encourages
opposite-sex couples who, by definition, are the only type of couples
that can reproduce on their own by engaging in sex with little or no
contemplation of the consequences that might result, i.e. a child, to
procreate responsibly.77

The same circumstance simply does not exist with same-sex
marriage. Even where the same-sex couple chooses to raise children, at
least one, and frequently both, of the partners have no biological
connection to the children. The decision to have children, then, becomes
entirely separate from the decision to marry and/or engage in sexual
relations, and the more widespread that notion becomes, the more
difficult will it be to sustain the procreative and paternal aspects of
marriage.
Maggie Gallagher, the President of the Institute for Marriage and
Public Policy, has described the problem as follows:
Same-sex marriage in Massachusetts is not merely about opening a new
set of legal benefits to more individuals . . . . The meaning of marriage
itself must change . . . . The procreative potential of sexual unions must
be reduced from the great, brute, obvious, important fact it has been
through most of human history, to a minor, not very significant feature
of human relationships, largely unrelated to any key purpose of
marriage. In the process, the idea that mothers and fathers are the norm
for children must also go.78

http://www.lcms.org/graphics/assets/media/CTCR/Human_Sexuality1.pdf).
77. Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 25 (Ind. App. 2005).
78. Maggie Gallagher, (How) Will Gay Marriage Weaken Marriage as a Social Institution: A
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Brigham Young University Law Professor Lynn Wardle has elaborated
on the point, describing the potential consequences of severing the link
between marriage and procreation:
Legalizing same-sex marriage would weaken the nexus between
procreation and parenting. The already ambiguous role and meaning of
parenthood would be made even more ambiguous. . . . The further
separation of procreation from marriage implicit in legalization of
same-sex marriage would send a cultural message of parental
disconnection from family duties that could further diminish the level
of responsibility of absent parents.79

These observations are confirmed even by many proponents of
same-sex marriage, who argue that there is not now any significant
connection between marriage and procreation and/or family structure
(fathers and mothers).80 For example, same-sex marriage activist E.J.
Graff argues that “[i]f same-sex marriage becomes legal, that venerable
institution will ever after stand for sexual choice, for cutting the link
between sex and diapers.”81 According to Professor William Eskridge,
the link between marriage and procreation has already been severed:
“[I]n today’s society the importance of marriage is relational not
procreational.”82 Andrew Sullivan makes a similar argument, suggesting
that “[f]rom being a means to bringing up children, [marriage] has
become primarily a way in which two adults affirm their emotional
commitment to one another.”83 And in the pending challenge to
California’s marriage laws, the City of San Francisco itself argues that
procreation is not an “essential or even important purpose for
Reply to Andrew Koppelman, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 33, 59-60 (2004).
79. Lynn D. Wardle, Multiply and Replenish: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of
State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUBL. POL’Y 771, 798 (2001).
80. As Professor Doug Kmiec notes, some advocates of same-sex marriage contend that there
never has been any link between marriage and procreation, or that such a link no longer exists today.
Criticizing such claims, Kmiec writes: “In truth, the advocates of same-sex marriage cannot
genuinely mean that procreation has not been, in fact, linked with marriage. Rather, what same-sex
partisans actually mean is that they would prefer procreation not to be associated with the marital
estate . . . . Sexual reproduction for the human species is not merely one of several equally attractive
ways to bring forth a child, it is the assumed way. It is no coincidence that those with religious
beliefs that correspond most strongly with a traditional understanding of marriage as linked to
procreation do, indeed, have the most children.” Douglas W. Kmiec, The Procreative Argument for
Proscribing Same-Sex Marriage, 32 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 653, 660 (2004).
81. E.J. Graff, Retying the Knot, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON: A READER, 134,
135-36 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1st ed., Vintage Books 1997).
82. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL
LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 11 (1996).
83. Andrew Sullivan, Introduction, to SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON: A READER, at
xix, n. 82 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997).
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marriage.”84
Judith Stacey, sociology professor at New York University,
approvingly suggests that redefining marriage to include same-sex
unions may help to supplant the marital family with a new ethic of
family diversity:
Legitimizing gay and lesbian marriages would promote a democratic,
pluralist expansion of the meaning, practice, and politics of family life
in the United States, helping to supplant the destructive sanctity of The
Family with respect for diverse and vibrant families. . . . If we begin to
value the meaning and quality of intimate bonds over their customary
forms, people might devise marriage and kinship patterns to serve
diverse needs. . . . Two friends might decide to “marry” without basing
their bond on erotic or romantic attachment. . . . Or, more radical still,
perhaps some might dare to question the dyadic limitations of Western
marriage and seek some of the benefits of extended family life through
small group marriages arranged to share resources, nurturance, and
labor. After all, if it is true that “The Two-Parent Family is Better” than
a single-parent family, as family-values crusaders proclaim, might not
three-, four-, or more-parent families be better yet, as many utopian
communards have long believed?85

A New Jersey Appellate court expressed the same insight, if in less
celebratory terms:
The same form of constitutional attack that plaintiffs mount against
statutes limiting the institution of marriage to members of the opposite
sex also could be made against statutes prohibiting polygamy. Persons
who desire to enter into polygamous marriages undoubtedly view such
marriages, just as plaintiffs view same-sex marriages, as “compelling
and definitive expressions of love and commitment” among the parties
to the union. Indeed, there is arguably a stronger foundation for
challenging statutes prohibiting polygamy than statutes limiting
marriage to members of the opposite sex “because, unlike gay
marriage, [polygamy] has been and still is condoned by many religions
and societies.”86

These kinds of consequences will not happen all at once, if they

84. San Francisco’s Opp. To Motions for Summary Judgment, Dec. 3, 2004, at 32, City and
County of San Francisco et al. v. State of California, No. CGC-04-429539 (S.F. Super. Ct.).
85. JUDITH STACEY, GAY AND LESBIAN FAMILIES: QUEER LIKE US, IN ALL OUR FAMILIES:
NEW POLICIES FOR A NEW CENTURY 117, 128-29 (Mary Ann Mason, Arlene Skolnick & Stephen D.
Sugarman eds., Oxford U. Press 1998).
86. Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 270 (N.J. App. 2005) (internal citations omitted).
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happen at all. They will affect behavior by gradually displacing an older
understanding of marriage with the new unisex model of interpersonal
commitment, only dimly if at all related to children or family structure.
To the extent the court establishes same-sex marriage as a civil right,
older conjugal views of marriage will be branded as discriminatory, and
(like racism) be subjected to social disapproval and indirect legal
pressure. Under these circumstances, fewer people – perhaps very few
indeed – in the public square will be willing to say that marriage is about
procreation and paternity, or that marriage matters because children need
mothers and fathers.
If, as seems likely, same-sex marriage interferes at all with the
capacity of marriage to channel the procreative energies of men and
women towards exclusive permanent sexual unions called “marriage,”
the result will be real harm to potentially millions of children. If it
interferes greatly, our society as a whole may well be put at risk.
V. HAS THE JUDICIARY USURPED A ROLE IN THIS POLICY DEBATE?
But the most troubling aspect of this massive shift in public policy is
that it has occurred almost entirely outside the deliberative political
process. Most of the efforts to redefine marriage are not coming through
state legislatures but rather are being imposed by courts, and even when
elected legislatures do become involved, it is often the result of court
orders that have already largely determined the outcome of the
legislature’s policy deliberations, with only the barest of pretext in
constitutional text. In Massachusetts, for example, the Supreme Judicial
Court in the Goodridge case found a right to same-sex marriage in a
Constitution that has been unchanged since 1780 when it was first
penned by John Adams, and no one has dared to suggest that John
Adams had same-sex marriage in mind when he penned those phrases, or
that such was in the minds of those who ratified that constitution. The
California courts seem poised to take the same step, in response to San
Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsome’s unilateral decision to hand out
marriage licenses to same-sex couples, altering a century and a half of
California marriage law and ignoring a recent, overwhelmingly-approved
state-wide voter initiative in the process.
Perhaps it is a necessary outgrowth of the shift from a societal
benefit model to an individual autonomy/rights model of marriage
described above, but these judicial decrees are not only overturning the
long-standing policy judgments of the people, they are pre-empting any
deliberation about the potential societal consequences of this massive
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social experiment. This was not the role our nation’s founders
envisioned for the Courts, but our interest here is more than simply
constitutional purity. Thomas Jefferson captured the concern perfectly in
a letter he wrote to William Charles Jarvies toward the end of his life:
“You seem to consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all
constitutional questions, a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and one
which would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy.”87 Abraham
Lincoln, criticizing the Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott v.
Sandford,88 made the identical point in his First Inaugural Address:
[T]he candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the government,
upon vital questions, affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably
fixed by decision of the Supreme Court, . . . the people will have
ceased, to be their own rulers, having, to that extent, practically
resigned their government, into the hands of that eminent tribunal.89

Whether one agrees with Goodridge and Lawrence or not, surely it is
evident that a judiciary powerful enough to impose such rules is also
powerful enough to impose the opposite rules whenever it strikes their
fancy. The despotic nature of the action itself, rather than the particular
action taken in any given instance, should give us all pause for concern.
The question is what ordinary citizens can do to address such arrogations
of power.
At the federal level, our Constitution actually envisions several
checks on the judicial power, just as it envisions several checks on the
powers of each of the other branches of government; the notion that the
judiciary is to be entirely independent of the political branches is a
relatively modern invention, and it is not only erroneous but dangerous.
The checks on the judiciary actually found in the Constitution run the
gambit from control over the nomination of “Judges of the Supreme
Court,” which is vested exclusively in the President,90 and control over
the actual appoint of judges, which is shared by the President and the
Senate,91 to Congress’s ability to define the scope of the jurisdiction and

87. Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvies, Sept. 28, 1820, available at http://memory.
loc.gov/master/mss/mtj/mtj1/052/0200/0275.jpg (last visited April 2, 2006).
88. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
89. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address—Final Text (Mar. 4, 1861), in 4 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 262, 268 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953), quoted in Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of Constitutional Interpretation: Some
Modest Proposals from the Twenty-Third Century, 59 ALB. L. REV. 671, 685 (1995).
90. U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
91. U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Congress may vest the appointment of “inferior officers”
“in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments,” and it remains an
open question whether lower court judges, who serve on “inferior Courts,” see Art. III, § 1, qualify
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even the very existence of the lower courts92 and also the scope of the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,”93 to Congress’s power over
appropriations,94 and ultimately to Congress’s power of impeachment.95
Yet most have proved to be utterly ineffective.
Quite frankly, it is becoming more and more clear that the full range
of these constitutional checks on the federal judiciary needs to be revived
as viable options—up to and even including the impeachment of judges
who, despite acknowledging that the Constitution does not address a
certain matter, will nevertheless invalidate acts of the elected legislature
by judicial fiat. Without such checks on the judiciary—and to the list of
constitutional provisions cited above we should add non-enforcement by
the Executive, a check suggested by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 78
for courts that exercise “Force” or “Will” instead of “merely judgment—
we are in danger of proving the predictions made by Jefferson and
Lincoln.
Similar horizontal checks exist on the judiciaries of the several
states, by virtue of various separation-of-powers provisions in their
respective state constitutions. The Judiciary Committee of the Colorado
House of Representatives, for example, recently held a hearing to
consider Articles of Impeachment against a Colorado state court judge
who had ignored Colorado’s prohibition on same-sex adoption and
ordered that a custodial parent be required to share custody of her child
with a former lesbian partner.96
The state courts also have vertical checks on them, most frequently
exhibited by virtue of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over
them.97 State court judges are bound to support the federal Constitution

as “inferior officers” for purposes of this alternate appointment mechanism.
92. U.S. Const. Art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested . . . in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish”).
93. U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction . . .
with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make”); Ex Parte McCardle,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
94. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law”).
95. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (“The House of Representatives . . . shall have the sole Power
of Impeachment”); Art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all
Impeachments”); Art. II, § 4 (“[A]ll civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office
on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors”); Art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behavior”).
96. Colo. H.R. 04-1007, Concerning the Impeachment of Judge John W. Coughlin;
Impeachment Hearing Before Colorado House of Representatives, Judiciary Committee (April 22,
2004); see also In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546 (Colo. App. 2004) (affirming in part, vacating in part,
and remanding to trial courts).
97. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
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as well,98 and Article IV, section 4 of that Constitution provides that
“The United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a
Republican Form of Government,” which, at its core, requires that major
policy judgments be made with the consent of the people rather than
imposed on them by an unaccountable judiciary.
Although claims premised on the Republican Guaranty Clause have
long been viewed as nonjusticiable political questions in most
circumstances,99 Justice O’Connor noted in New York v. United States
“that perhaps not all claims under the Guarantee Clause present
nonjusticiable political questions.”100 “Contemporary commentators,”
she noted, “have likewise suggested that courts should address the merits
of such claims, at least in some circumstances.101 Several lower courts
have, post-New York, acknowledged that the Republican Guarantee
Clause might present justiciable questions, but thus far all have found
that the Clause had not been violated in the particular circumstances at
issue in the cases.102 For these courts, the essence of the republican
guaranty is the right of a State’s citizens to “structure their government
as they see fit,”103 and in New York itself, the Supreme Court dismissed
the Guarantee Clause claim only because the statute in that case did not
“pose any realistic risk of altering the form or the method of functioning
of New York’s government.”104 When courts take it upon themselves to
decide major social policy issues without express textual support in the
state or federal constitutions, the basic separation-of-powers structure of
those constitutions is violated.
There is a final check on both federal and statute judiciaries that
should be addressed, namely, the right of the people to amend the
Constitution,105 essentially removing from the courts any claimed

98. U.S. Const. Art. 6, cl. 3.
99. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 46-47 (1849).
100. 505 U.S. 144, 183 (1992).
101. Id. at 185 (citing L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 398 (2d ed. 1988)); J. Ely,
Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 118, and n., 122-23 (1980); W. Wiecek, The
Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution 287-89, 300 (1972); D. Merritt, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7078 (Jan. 1988); Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional
Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513, 560-65 (1962)).
102. See Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661, 667 (5th Cir. 1997); Adams v. Clinton, 90
F.Supp.2d 35 (D.D.C. 2000); New Jersey v. United States, 91 F.3d 463, 468-69 (3rd Cir. 1996);
Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23, 27-28 (2nd Cir. 1996); Deer Park Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Harris Cty.
Appraisal Dist., 132 F.3d 1095, 1099-1100 (5th Cir. 1998); City of New York v. United States, 179
F.3d 29 (2nd Cir. 1999); Kelley v. United States, 69 F.3d 1503, 1511 (10th Cir. 1995). But see State
ex. rel. Huddleston v. Sawyer, 932 P.2d 1145 (Or. 1997) (holding that such claims remain
nonjusticiable).
103. Kelley, 69 F.3d at 1511.
104. 505 U.S. at 186.
105. U.S. Const. Art. V; See also Declaration of Independence ¶ 2 (1776).
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authority over the subject. The proposed Federal Marriage Protection
Amendment currently pending before Congress is just such an effort.
The first provision of the proposed amendment, aimed at the federal
courts, would preempt any Supreme Court decision that would judicially
impose same-sex “marriage” on the entire country, mandating that
“Marriage in the United States shall consist only of union of a man and a
woman.” But as we learned in Goodridge and elsewhere, there are a
number of state courts that have done or will soon do the same thing, so a
second provision of the FMPA would bar activist state courts from
judicially imposing same-sex marriage at the state level. “Neither this
Constitution [the federal], nor the constitution of any state shall be
construed”—that’s not a bar on legislative action, for it is courts that
“construe” constitutional provisions—”to require that marriage or the
legal incidence thereof be conferred upon any other union than the union
of a man and a woman.”
Despite protestations to the contrary, the FMPA currently under
consideration in Congress would not bar state legislators from
authorizing civil unions and otherwise conferring on same-sex couples
some of the benefits of marriage. But such judgments would, under the
FMPA, have to be made by the elected branches of government as a
matter of social policy, judgments that would be well within the exercise
of the state’s police power—the power to regulate the health, safety,
welfare, and morals of the people.
In other words, the Federal Marriage Protection Amendment is both
pro-federalism and pro-separation of powers. It would prevent courts
from imposing a national rule on the states, and it would prevent state
courts from imposing their will against the will of the people of their
state. There would be a restoration of the people’s primary role in
determining fundamental questions of social policy that can have, and in
the past (in such matters as no-fault divorce) have had massive social
consequences. These are questions of social policy and they ought to be
deliberated by the body politic rather than imposed by unelected judges.
Otherwise, we should all fear that Lincoln’s prediction has come true—
that if policy decisions affecting the whole people are to be “irrevocably
fixed” by judicial decision, “the people will have ceased, to be their own
rulers, having, to that extent, practically resigned their government, into
the hands of that eminent tribunal.”106

106. Abraham Lincoln, supra note 89.

